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vaeate an order 
(Prob. Code, 
[2] Id. -Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.- The 
widow's to a allowance is conditioned on her right 
to support at the time of her husband's death. 
[3] Id. -Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.-Ordi-
narily the widow establishes a prima facie case for a family 
allowance by showing that the marriage relation continued 
until the time of her husband's death, and she is not reqmred 
to allege and prove that there were no circumstances by which 
she lost the right of support ordinarily inherent in her position 
as a wife. 
[4] Id.- Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.- The 
widow's right to a family allowance is not ordinarily lost 
merely because the spouses were living apart at the time the 
husband died or because she had been supporting herself with-
out financial aid from the husband. 
[5) !d.-Family Allowance-Persons Entitled-Widow.-Though 
a wife, under the terms of a support decree, was not receiving 
support payments from her husband at the time of his death, 
and she could have sought modification of that decree during 
his lifetime if she could have shown sufficiently changed cir-
cumstances occurring before the death, his death should not 
prevent her from thereafter seeking a family allowance based 
on changed circumstances occurring before his death, nor 
should she be penalized for not seeking modification of the 
decree during his last illness: if the probate court should find 
on competent evidence that cireumstances had changed suffi-
ciently so that the support decree could have been modified 
during the husband's lifetime to provide further support and 
(2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 331; Am. 
Jur., Executors and § 318. 
[ 4] Effect of extrajudicial 
to widow's allowance, note, 34 
on surviving spouse's right 
1056. 
McK. Dig. References: (1] Decedents' Estates, § 1131; [2-6) 
Decedents' Estates, § 314. 
the widow after his 
his 
for 
!d.-Family Allowance- Persons Entitled- Widow.-There 
was no basis for 
personal 
was mere evidence his continued 
her their marita.l differences. 
APPEAL from orders of the Court of the City and 
County of San Francisco a allowance and 
refusing to vacate such orders for family allowance. T. I. 
Fitzpatrick, Judge. Orders granting family allowance, re-
versed; appeal from order to vacate such orders for 
family allowance, dismissed. 
Lange & Rockwell and C. Dan I.~ange for Appellant. 
Appel, Liebermann & Leonard and Cyril Appel for R~­
spondent. 
SPENCE, J.-American Trust Company, special adminis-
trator of the above estate, appeals from two orders granting 
a family allowance of $1,000 a month to Margaret Fallon, 
widow of the deceased, and from an order refusing to vacate 
these orders for family allowance. [1] The order denying 
the petition to vacate the order granting a family allowance 
is not an appealable order. (Prob. Code, § 1240.) The ap-
peal from that order will therefore be dismissed. (Estate of 
Caldwell, 67 Cal.App.2d 652 [155 P.2d 380] .) 
The administrator attacks the propriety of the award of a 
family allowance to the widow under the particular circum-
stances of this case. The record sustains its position, and 
the orders granting such allowance must be reversed. 
Frederick Arthur Fallon died on November 18, 1955, 
aged approximately 86. Shortly thereafter the trust company 
filed its petition for the probate of his will. On December 15, 
1955, the widow filed her verified petition for a family allow-
ance, seeking $2,500 per month. She claimed that the estate 
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had a value in excess of $600,000 and that its monthly income 
was adequate to pay the allowance she sought. 
At the hearing it appeared that she and deceased had mar 
ried in 1940 and bad filed reciprocal divorce actions in 1945 
Both parties were denied divorces but the court awarded 
Mrs. Fallon support of $250 a month for one year only. Thi~ 
decree was affirmed on appeal. (Fallon v. Fallon, 83 Cal 
App.2d 798 [189 P.2d 7661.) The husband made the ordered 
payments for the one year and then stopped. Some seven 
years elapsed before the husband's death, during which time 
Mrs. Fallon moved to British Columbia and received no fur-
ther payments from him. 
On December 22, 1955, the court granted the widow a 
family allowance of $1,000 per month. On December 29, 
1955, the court, on the trust company's petition, appointed 
it special administrator of the estate. On January 4, 1956. 
the court filed a second order identical to its previous order 
granting the widow the $1,000 monthly family allowance. 
Thereafter the special administrator filed its petition seeking 
vacation of the orders granting the family allowance. It 
alleged that because of the previous divorce proceedings 
(Fallon v. Fallon, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 798) the widow was 
not entitled to a family allowance. [t also alleged that, as 
guardian of the deceased's estate, it had filed an inventory on 
December 6, 1955, showing assets of some $337,000 and income 
for 1955 of less than $10,000. After a hearing this petition 
was denied. 
[2] The right of a wife to a family allowance is conditioned 
rrpon her right to support at the time of her husband's death 
(Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724].) [3] Ordi-
narily the wife establishes a prima facie case for an allowance 
by showing that the marriage relation continued until the 
time of her husband's death. She is not required to allege and 
prove that there were no circumstances by which she lost 
this right to support, which is ordinarily inherent in her 
position as a wife. [4] Nor is the right ordinarily lost 
merely because the spouses were living apart at the time that 
the husband died or because the wife had been supporting 
herself without financial aid from the husband. (Estate of 
Coons, 107 Cal.App.2d 531. 536 [237 P.2d 291]; see 34 
A.L.R.2d 1056.) The effect of the award for the wife's support 
for a limited period, which expired before the husband's 
death, however, is an additional circumstance which must be 
considered here. 
Nov.l957] EsTATE OF FALLON 
[49 C.2d 402: 317 P.2d 963] 
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In Estate of Brooks, supra, 28 Cal.2d 748, the wife 
had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce which made 
no provision for her support. While the marriage continues 
until the final decree, an "interlocutory judgment of divorce 
is ... so far as it determines the rights of the parties. a 
eontract between them .... Until that contract is in some 
manner changed, either in the action or in somE' independent 
proceeding, or by a recom·iliation. her right to support is 
-;uspended." (London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com .. 
181 CaL 460, 465-467 [ 184 P 864].) 
This court in the Brooks case noted that the manifest pur-
pose of the family allowance is "to continue during the settle-
ment of the t>state, the support that the wife was previously 
receiving or was at least entitled to receive." (28 Cal.2d at 
p. 755.) Since the wife there was not entitled to support 
under the divorce decree, the order granting a widow's allow-
ance was reversed. 
A situation more similar to the present case was in-
volved in Monroe v. Superior Cou1·t, 28 Cal.2d 427 [170 P.2d 
4731, where the wife had been granted separate maintenance 
for only a limited period. After that period expired, sht> 
sought a further allowance for her support. "alleging that 
the circumstances upon which the decree was based had 
materially changed." (28 Cal.2d at p. 428.) This court held 
that additional support might be granted, although jurisdic· 
tion to do so had not been reserved in the original decree, if 
sufficiently changed circumstances were shown Relief could 
be granted since a "separate maintenance decree does no1 
end the marriage" nor "the obligation to support'' arising 
from it, but "only regulates the extent of that support." ( 28 
Cal.2d at p. 429.) 
[5] While the wife here, under the terms of the support 
decree, was not receiving support payment;; from her hus-
band at the time of his death, she could have sought modifica-
tion of that decree during his lifetime if she could have shown 
sufficiently changed circumstances occurrmg before the death. 
(Monroe v. Superwr Court, s1~pra. 28 Cal.2d 427; O'Toole v 
O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441 [10 P.2d 461].) His death should no1 
prevent her from thereafter seeking a family allowance based 
on changed eircumstance~ occurring before his demise (see 
ln re Nowell, 99 F 931) nor should she be penalized for not 
seeking a modification of the dt>cree during his last illness. If 
the probate court finds, upon competent evidence, that cir-
cumstances had changed sufficiently so that the support decree 
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could modified the husband's lifetime to 
was therefore entitled 
at the time of the husband's that court could 
death. 
allowance for the widow after his 
reveals no evidence of such 
before the death of the bus-
the widow that the fact that her 
which he> 
"'"·"'""'""' in his will bequeathing his widow 
as evidence of his continued 
toward her their marital differences. 
We therefore conclude that in the absence of evidence upon 
which the probate court could have found that the widow was 
entitled by reason of changed circumstances to support from 
her husband at the time of his death there was no basis for 
the granting of the family allowance. 
The orders granting the allowance are reversed. The 
appeal from the order denying the petition to vacate said 
orders for family allowance is dismissed. Appellant shall 
recover costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
McComb, concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion neither Estate of Brooks, 28 Ca1.2d 748 [171 
P.2d 724], nor London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
181 Cal. 460 [184 P. 864], announces a rule of law which may 
be invoked to defeat the claim of Mrs. Fallon to a family 
allowance here. Furthermore, this is not a Monroe case 
(Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 CaL2d 427 [170 P.2d 473] ). 
'l'here, an action for separate maintenance had been brought 
by the wife, and after issue had been tried and a 
decree rendered which had become final. In that case the 
trial court had entered a decree of separate maintenance 
which contained no reservation of as to property 
and which to be a final decree 
and forever settle the reciprocal rights and obli-
gations of the It made for support of a 
minor child; it awarded to the wife as her sole and separate 
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therein; it awarded to her amount of 
the husband for 27 months com-
and certain insurance which was 
to be in force the husband for her benefit and that of 
the child; it awarded the as his sole and 
a certain automobile. bank and 
bonds. It was my view as .ov'"""''""n'" in my dis-
selltiUil' ~"·~·.~~ in that case Cal.2d that the decree 
which had become was res adjudicata on 
the issues there and I am still of that opinion. 
actions for divorce were brought by both parties which 
resulted in a judgment either party a divorce but 
awarded the wife $250 per month for her support for one 
year pursuant to section 136 of the Civil Code. Unquestion-
ably, either party could thereafter have brought another ac-
tion for divorce based upon conduct of the other occurring 
after the rendition of the former judgment, and the court 
would have had jurisdiction in such an action to make such 
provision for the support and maintenance of either party 
which the pleadings and evidence warranted. Such being the 
law, the court here unquestionably has jurisdiction to pass 
upon the issue of family allowance to the widow notwith-
standing the former judgment denying a divorce to either 
party. The effect of the prior judgment was not to determine 
the right of the wife to support and maintenance for all time 
as this issue was not litigated in the divorce action. It would 
seem clear that if the wife was not entitled to a divorce in the 
former actions, she was not entitled to permanent alimony or 
separate maintenance. The allowance to her of $250 per 
month for one year was only temporary and should not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction to make a subsequent adjudi-
cation of this issue. 
It must be obvious that if an award of separate maintenance 
is made for a definite period, and becomes final, and the hus-
band should die during such period, the award could not 
thereafter be increased or extended, and an award of alimony 
would terminate upon the husband's death (Hilton v. McNitt, 
ante, p. 79 [315 P.2d 1]) with no power in a court to 
modify it. Such is not the situation here, and it is my view 
that the prior judgment in the divorce actions and the al-
lowance of temporary support pursuant to section 136 of the 
Civil Code in no way impedes the jurisdiction of the probate 
court to determine what if any family allowance should be 
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awarded to Mrs. Fallon in the probate proceedings on her 
husband's estate. In other words, the court had jurisdiction 
to hear all competent evidence relative to the status of the 
parties prior to the death of the decedent and make an award 
in favor of Mrs. Fallon for a family allowance if such an 
award was justified by the evidence. In my opinion the trial 
court was justified in making an award for a family allow-
ance in favor of Mrs. Fallon and its order should, therefore, 
be affirmed. 
SHENK, J.-1 dissent. The majority opinion relies on 
Bstate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724] and Monroe 
v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.2d 427 1170 P.2d 473] as authority 
for holding that where during marriage an order for main-
tenance and support has been made to the wife for a limited 
period and no decree of divorce has been granted, a showing 
of changed circumstances must thereafter be made as a neces-
sary foundation for an award of a family allowance from the 
estate of her deceased husband. 
In Estate of Brooks, an interlocutory decree of divorce had 
settled the property rights of the parties and terminated the 
right to support. In the present case the widow's right to 
support was not terminated by the 1945 support order. If she 
had petitioned the court for additional support during Mr. 
Fallon's lifetime, she might have obtained it, under the 
holding of this court in the Monroe case, upon a showing of 
changed circumstances and by modification of the order. 
Upon Mr. Fallon's death, however, Mrs. Fallon was no longer 
entitled to move for a modification of the prior support order. 
(See Hilton v. McNitt, ante, p. 79 [315 P.2d 1]; Civ. Code, 
§ 139. J Her right thereafter to any financial assistance re-
sulting from the marital relationship became a preferential 
statutory right under section 680 of the Probate Code which 
provides that the widow is ". . . entitled to such reasonable 
allowance out of the estate as shall be necessary for [her] 
maintenance according to [her] circumstances, during the 
progress of the settlement of the estate. . . . " 
This court now requires the surviving widow to show, before 
she may obtain a family allowance after the death of her 
husband, such change of conditions as would entitle her to a 
modification of a support order made during the lifetime of 
her deceased husband. Such a requirement should relate only 
to the distinct and separate remedy in a proceeding to modify 
the support order made during the husband's lifetime. 
The Brooks case should not be extended beyond a holding 
Nov.l957] PEOPLE v. McCAUGHAN 
[49 C.2d 409: 317 P.2d 974] 
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that where the to support has been terminated during 
the lifetime of the husband no family allowance may be 
granted from his estate. It is a sufficient showing to entitle 
her to a family allowance that Mrs. Fallon's right to support 
was not cut off by the expiration of the 1945 support order 
The court now extends the Brooks and Monroe cases to reach 
a result which is neither consonant with the holdings of those 
cases nor with the direct terms and unquestioned spirit of 
Probatf' Code. section 680 I would affirm the orders. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
17, 1957. Shenk. ,J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 6050. In Bank. Nov. 19, 1957.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VELVA IRENE 
McCAUGHAN, Appellant. 
[1] Statutes-Validity-Certainty.-A statute which either for-
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common knowledge must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and differ as to its application violates the first essential 
of due process of law. 
[2] Criminal Law-Prohibition by Law-Sufficiency and Validity 
of Enactment.-A statute must be definite enough to provide 
a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed 
as well as a standard for the ascertainment of guilt by the 
courts called on to apply it. 
[3] Statutes-Validity-Certainty.-A statute will be upheld if 
its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to the 
common law or to its legislative history or purpose. 
[4] Id.-Validity-Certainty.-A statute will be upheld, despite 
the fact that the acts it prohibits are defined in vague terms, 
if it requires an adequately defined specific intent. 
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 36; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 382. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 13, 14, 100; Am.Jur., 
Criminal Law, § 19 . 
.McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Statutes, § 37; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 9; [ 6-9, 11, 20] Insane Persons, § 51.5; [10] Statutes, § 36; 
[12] Criminal Law, § 561(1); [13-15] Witnesses, § 27; [16] Wit-
nesses, § 32; [17, 19] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [18] Criminal Law, 
§ 393(1). 
